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Abstract
Using the recently introduced declination function, we estimate the net number of seats
won in the US House of Representatives due to asymmetries in vote distributions. Such
asymmetries can arise from combinations of partisan gerrymandering and inherent geo-
graphic advantage. Our estimates show significant biases in favor of the Democrats prior
to the mid 1990s and significant biases in favor of Republicans since then. We find net
differences of 28, 20 and 25 seats in favor of the Republicans in the years 2012, 2014 and
2016, respectively. The validity of our results is supported by the technique of simulated
packing and cracking. We also use this technique to show that the presidential-vote logistic
regression model is insensitive to the packing and cracking by which partisan gerrymanders
are achieved.
1 Introduction
The partisan composition of the US House of Representatives is the result of a number of fac-
tors: the economy, social issues, who is president, party platforms, voter ID laws, propaganda,
campaign finance laws, the characteristics and incumbency statuses of individual candidates,
and district plans, to name a few. Our focus in this paper is on district plans.
A partisan gerrymander is, by definition, a district plan that enables a party to win more
seats than it would have under a “neutral” district plan. It is sometimes easy to detect a parti-
san gerrymander. For example, a North Carolina legislator openly admitted that his committee
planned to redraw districts with a goal of partisan advantage [Gan16]. Other times the con-
voluted shapes of districts provide evidence that is almost as compelling. In fact, significant
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energy has been devoted to developing geometric methods of identifying gerrymandered dis-
tricts (see [NGCH90] for an overview). But none of these geometric approaches provide a direct
way to determine the number of extra seats that have been won through the gerrymander — the
fundamental purpose of a partisan gerrymander.
In the first part of this paper we use the declination function, δ, introduced by the second
author in [War17], to estimate the effect of asymmetries in how district plans treat the two major
parties on the number of House seats won by each. To do so, we explore more thoroughly the
scaled function 5Nδ/12 which we refer to in this paper as the S-declination. (The variable, N ,
denotes the number of districts in the election; “S” is intended to remind the reader that this
scaling counts seats.) We argue that the S-declination provides a good estimate of the number
of extra seats won through these partisan asymmetries.
Remark 1. In [War17] we consider a similar scaling of Nδ/2. While simpler, this appears to
slightly overcount the number of seats in a given state and year. The effect is not significant
when single-state US House elections are considered as is done in [War17], but in the typically
larger state legislatures or when considering national effects, the difference between the two
scalars is non-trivial.
Table 1 presents the results of applying the S-declination to the US House elections since
1972. The data indicate that, on a national level, while the Democrats consistently benefited
through the early 1990s from partisan asymmetry in district plans, the situation has been re-
versed since the late 1990s.
There have been a number of previous attempts to estimate the net effect of gerrymandering
on a national level (see, e.g., the references in [CC16]). The most recent of which we are
aware is a report [RL17] by Royden and Li that considers House elections since 2012. Our
estimate for the year 2012 of 28 extra republican seats falls within 25–36, the narrower of
the two ranges provided by Royden and Li. However, our estimate differs markedly from the
estimate of approximately one seat arrived at in a recent paper [CC16] by Chen and Cottrell.
(See also, [Wan16, pgs. 36,37] whose results are intermediate to those of the mentioned studies.)
In the second part of this paper we attempt to explain the discrepancy between the Chen-
Cottrell estimate and the two other estimates. Our main tool will be a simulated packing and
cracking technique that we introduce in Section 2. We first use this technique to validate the S-
declination as a means of counting extra seats. We then use it to show that the logistic-regression
approach of Chen and Cottrell is insensitive to the main technique of partisan gerrymandering.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the necessary background
and terminology on both partisan gerrymandering as well as on packing and cracking. We also
describe a simple framework for simulated packing and cracking that we use in later sections
to gauge how faithfully various methods register partisan gerrymandering efforts. In Section 3
we review the declination function and show using the packing and cracking technique that the
declination faithfully registers partisan gerrymandering. In Table 1 we record the net number
of seats in House elections since 1972 that, according to the declination, should be attributed
to partisan asymmetry in the vote distribution. In Section 4 we show that the model utilized
2
Figure 1: Symmetric vote distributions for fair elections with equally popular parties.
in [CC16] is insensitive to packing and cracking, thereby explaining the discrepancy between
their estimate and the estimates of both this paper and [RL17]. We end with our conclusion.
2 Background
Partisan gerrymanders have historically been recognized by identifying individual districts with
contorted boundaries. The primary advantage of this approach is that wild shapes are immedi-
ately convincing as evidence of nefariousness. Unfortunately, there are several disadvantages.
First, there are many valid reasons for a district to have a strange shape (e.g., geographic con-
straints, the Voting Rights Act, and county boundaries). Second, gerrymandering can occur
without particularly unusual boundaries. Third, the shapes of the districts do not directly tell
one anything about how effective the gerrymander is in winning additional seats for one party.
An alternative approach to the study of district shapes is to analyze the distribution of votes
among the various districts. In this section we introduce the notation and terminology neces-
sary to work with these distributions and to see the effect partisan gerrymandering has on them.
We assume that each district has the same number of total votes.
We define an N -district election to be a weakly increasing sequence ` = (`1, `2, . . . , `N) in
which `i indicates the democratic fraction of the two-party (legislative) vote in district i. We
visualize ` by plotting a point vi = (i/N − 1/2N, `i) for each i. Figure 1 illustrates plots of `
for three hypothetical elections.
While researchers are still working on robust tests both for identifying gerrymanders and
for assessing the effects of gerrymandering, how partisan gerrymandering occurs is well un-
derstood: Parties create partisan gerrymanders by “packing and cracking” votes. Suppose the
Democrats are in control of redistricting and the Republicans are poised to win district X . In
packing, Republicans are moved from X to other districts in which the Republicans already
have enough strength to win. These votes are effectively wasted in the new districts while
district X falls to the Democrats. Cracking works similarly, except now the Republicans are
spread among districts that they have no chance of winning. Once the cracking occurs, the re-
cipient districts are lost by the Republicans by smaller margins, but they are still lost. Figure 2
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Figure 2: (A) Repeat of election from Figure 1.A. (B) Illustration of packing of the distribution
from (A) for a gain of two republican seats. (C) Illustration of cracking of the distribution from
(A) for a gain of two republican seats.
illustrates the effect of packing and cracking on the vote distribution illustrated in Figure 1.A.
2.1 Simulated packing and cracking
In order to validate the S-declination (see Section 3) as a measure of the number of extra seats
won under a partisan gerrymander, we will examine how perturbations of a vote distribution
by packing and/or cracking affect the value of the S-declination. The simple technique we
will use is that of simulated packing and cracking (SPC). In short, we manually modify a vote
distribution by packing or cracking so as to flip a single district from one party to the other.
There are four possible composite choices: whether we are packing or cracking and whether it
is the Republicans or the Democrats who are in charge of the gerrymander. In reality, the votes
from the flipped district could be distributed among other districts by a combination of packing
and cracking, but we do not attempt to model this. We focus below on the case in which the
Republicans are flipping a single democratic district to republican control using cracking. The
other three cases are treated similarly.
In practice, the details of a gerrymander will depend on many factors. One such factor will
be the geography of the state. If a given district is being cracked so as to turn it from a demo-
cratic district to a republican district, the surplus democratic voters will have to be allocated to
adjacent districts. Of course, this process can be iterated by swapping other democratic voters
for republican voters in second-order neighbors of the original district. Nonetheless, there are
obvious geographic constraints that may be significant. Another factor is how risk averse the
gerrymandering party is. For example, if the Democrats wish to maximize their potential gain in
seats (albeit at a high risk of the plan backfiring) they can crack republican districts by creating
districts that are (say) 49% republican. On the other hand, if the Democrats feel the political
winds will be against them in the upcoming decade, they may prefer to pack Republicans into
districts so that the democratic districts are no more than (say) 35% republican.
For our model, we make the following conventions for how the gerrymander is achieved.
4
1. The flipped district is the democratic district that is won by the narrowest margin.
2. The gerrymander does not create any new republican-majority districts with a demo-
cratic vote fraction of greater than 0.45. We choose this value on the basis that a 45–55
split is frequently considered the threshold for a race to be competitive (see, for exam-
ple, [AAG06]). Any republican-majority district with a democratic vote fraction higher
than this before the cracking is allowed to remain at such a level.
3. The modified democratic vote fraction in the flipped district is chosen according to a
linear regression of the democratic vote fractions among the republican districts. If the
linear regression yields a new democratic vote fraction in the flipped district greater than
0.45, then the value is set to exactly 0.45.
4. The democratic votes shifted from the flipped district are distributed evenly among the
republican-majority districts with a democratic vote fraction of at most 0.45. In order to
avoid violating the second convention, this process may need to be iterated (see Example 2
below).
In order to illustrate the method in practice we present the following example of flipping
a district from democratic to republican by cracking. While we use hypothetical data in this
example, all subsequent applications of simulated packing and cracking in this paper involve
vote distributions from actual elections.
Example 2. Consider a 10-district election
` = (0.37, 0.40, 0.43, 0.46, 0.60, 0.63, 0.66, 0.69, 0.72, 0.75).
By Convention 1, we flip the fifth district. A linear regression of the four points{
i
10
− 1
2 · 10 , `i
}4
i=1
= {(0.05, 0.37), (0.15, 0.40), (0.25, 0.43), (0.35, 0.46)}
yields a line with intercept 0.355 and slope 0.3. Thus, according to the linear regression line,
the flipped district should be switched from a democratic vote fraction of 0.6 to one of 0.49.
However, by Convention 3 we instead choose a value of 0.45. In order to maintain the same
statewide democratic vote fraction, there must be a net increase of 0.15 among the first three
districts (note that the fourth district is not included since its democratic vote fraction already
exceeds 0.45). Convention 4 instructs us to distribute these democratic votes evenly among the
three districts. The resulting vote distribution is
(0.42, 0.45, 0.48, 0.46, 0.45, 0.63, 0.66, 0.69, 0.72, 0.75).
However, following Convention 4, we iterate the process by redistributing the excess fraction of
0.03 = 0.48− 0.45 from the third district evenly among the first two districts. Since the second
5
district is already at a value of 0.45, the amount is entirely distributed to the first district. This
yields a final vote distribution of
`∗ = (0.45, 0.45, 0.45, 0.46, 0.45, 0.63, 0.66, 0.69, 0.72, 0.75).
We utilize SPC for two purposes in this paper. In each instance, we analyze a vote distri-
bution using some function both before and after the SPC. We have rerun the analyses in this
paper with different values of the maximum democratic vote fraction equal to 0.40 and 0.49. We
have also analyzed the effect of a “greedy” distribution of votes in which the extra votes from
the flipped district are distributed to the districts whose democratic and republican votes are
distributed most unevenly. The resulting data and figures corresponding to Figures 4, 6 and 8
are qualitatively very similar.
3 The declination
The declination function was introduced in [War17] as a way of identifying potential gerry-
manders by quantifying partisan asymmetry in the vote distribution. A number of other vote-
distribution functions created for this purpose can be found in the literature (several of these are
mentioned in Section 4).
The declination is based on two observations. The first is that a constitutionally manageable
standard for partisan gerrymandering could conceivably be based on some measure of partisan
asymmetry, that is, a measure of how the district plan treats the parties differently. The second
observation, which we make in [War17], is that there should be nothing special about the 50%
vote threshold in individual districts. Combining these observations leads us to compute the
ratio of “average winning margin” to “fraction of seats won” for each party. The declination
is simply a comparison of these two ratios. If the 50% threshold is truly not special, then the
resulting ratios for each party should be approximately equal. The declination can be computed
geometrically as follows (see [War17] for details).
Let vi denote the point (i/N − 1/2N, `i) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Place a point F at the center
of mass of the points vi corresponding to the districts the Democrats lose; a pointH at the center
of mass of the points vi the Democrats win; and a third point G at (k/N, 1/2), where k is the
number of districts the Democrats lose. See Figure 3.
If the district plan treats the parties symmetrically, we would expect the point G to lie on
the line FH . As such we define the declination, δ, to be 2/pi times the angle between the lines
FG and GH (using the convention that a counterclockwise angle from FG to GH is measured
positively). Multiplication by 2/pi converts from radians to fractions of 90 degrees. Therefore,
possible values of the declination are between −1 and 1. Positive values indicate a republican
advantage while negative values indicate a democratic advantage.
6
Figure 3: Illustration of the two lines FG and GH arising in the definition of the declination,
δ, for the 13-district 2014 North Carolina congressional election. Districts have been sorted in
increasing order of democratic vote share. The value of δ is approximately 0.54 in this case.
3.1 The S-declination
The declination metric was introduced for the purpose of measuring the degree to which district
plans result in partisan asymmetry in the vote distribution. It is essentially an angle associated
to each election and it is not obvious that it can be used to provide a good estimate of how many
extra seats have been won due to the asymmetry. While the declination itself does not count
seats, we propose that the S-declination, which we set equal to 5Nδ/12, does.
To support this claim we use SPC on the vote distributions from a number of elections and
examine the effect on the S-declination. If the distribution is modified by flipping one district
from democratic to republican through packing or cracking, the S-declination should increase
by about one. If the flip is from republican to democratic, it should decrease by about one.
To this end, we consider the data set from [War17] consisting of all state-wide elections to the
US House of Representatives in presidential-election years since 1972. (Note that a multilevel
model is used in [War17] to impute the democratic vote fraction for uncontested elections.) For
any such election we can attempt to pack or crack it in favor of either party. In Figure 4 we
illustrate the change in S-declination for those instances in which the SPC is successful.
The instances of SPC plotted in Figure 4 are restricted in two ways. First, we require that
each party win at least one seat both before and after the packing/cracking. This is necessary
for the S-declination of each distribution to be defined. Second, we require that there be at least
three districts into which to distribute the votes from the flipped district. For example, when a
seat is being flipped from democratic to republican by cracking, we require that there be at least
three republican seats in the original distribution. Together, these restrictions exclude states in
which there are four or fewer congressional districts. In the current apportionment cycle there
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are 21 such states:
AK, AR, DE, HI, IA, ID, KS, ME, MS, MT, ND,
NE, NH, NM, NV, RI, SD, UT, VT, WV, and WY.
There were 352 state-year pairs in which there were at least five districts and each party won at
least one seat. Given the four possible combinations of packing/cracking and pro-republican/pro-
democratic, this offers 1408 possible applications of SPC. However, for 415 of these, either
there was not enough room for the chosen packing/cracking or one of the constraints was not
satisfied.
When flipping a seat from democratic to republican, we find that 95% of the time the S-
declination changes by an amount between 0.69 and 1.20. For a flip from republican to demo-
cratic, the corresponding range is −1.26 to −0.74. We conclude that the declination is a rea-
sonably good recorder of packing and cracking.
We estimate how many net seats have been won in each year on the basis of partisan asym-
metry in the vote distribution as follows: For a given year add together the values of the S-
declination (rounded to the nearest integer) for each state. The results are shown in Table 1.
Unfortunately, the S-declination simply provides an estimate without error bounds. Note that a
given state-year does not contribute to the sum from that year if one party wins all of the seats in
the state that year. However, we do not place the additional constraints used for the generation
of Figure 4 as the values in Table 1 rely only on actual vote distributions and not on values
derived from SPC.
Table 1: Net effect of vote-distribution asymmetry on partisan composition of House as
determined by S-declination. Positive (negative) values indicate a benefit to Republicans
(Democrats).
Year Seats Year Seats Year Seats Year Seats Year Seats
1972 -1 1982 -16 1992 -7 2002 5 2012 28
1974 -2 1984 -20 1994 0 2004 20 2014 20
1976 -23 1986 -10 1996 12 2006 20 2016 25
1978 -28 1988 -19 1998 9 2008 7
1980 -10 1990 -12 2000 13 2010 17
4 Two recent studies
We now turn our attention to two recent studies that have also attempted to answer the question
of the net result of gerrymandering in the House.
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Figure 4: Plot of change in the S-declination due to SPC. Red squares indicate the 502 ways in
which presidential-year House elections since 1972 can be packed/cracked so that the Republi-
cans win one more seat, subject to the constraints noted in the main text; blue circles indicate the
491 corresponding ways in which presidential-year elections since 1972 can be packed/cracked
so that the Democrats won one more seat. Note that horizontal coordinates have been jittered
for clarity. The linear regression lines are 0.908 + 0.004N (r2 = 0.05, RMSE = 0.17) and
−0.9305− 0.004N (r2 = 0.09, RMSE = 0.16), respectively.
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4.1 Royden and Li study
The most recent study, a Brennan Center [RL17] report by Royden and Li, considers House
elections since 2012. The authors’ approach is to use functions (akin to the declination) that
identify gerrymanders by quantifying asymmetries in the vote distribution among districts.
They consider three such functions from the literature: the efficiency gap [McG14, MS15],
the seats-votes curve [MSK15] and the median-mean difference [KMM+16, MB15, Wan16].
The first two of these functions are able to provide estimates of the number of seats won as a
result of gerrymandering. For the 2012 congressional elections, these functions both come to
very similar conclusions: the Republicans gained between 25 and 37 extra seats. The estimate
from Table 1 falls at the lower end of this range. An important caveat to their methodology
is that it does not account for any inherent democratic disadvantage owing to geographic clus-
tering. This is true of the declination as well. However, the authors find a high correlation
between states with single-party redistricting control and large numbers of extra seats, thereby
suggesting that geography fails to account for a significant portion of the asymmetry.
4.2 Chen and Cottrell study
In [CC16], Chen and Cottrell take what is perhaps a more intuitive approach to evaluating the
net effect of gerrymandering. For each state, they use 200 computer-generated “neutral” district
plans as a standard to which the results of the enacted district plan are compared. Utilizing ag-
gregated precinct-level presidential vote data, they estimate the probability that each simulated
district in each simulated plan elects a democratic representative. These probabilities, over all
districts, immediately yield an expected number of democratic representatives in the House un-
der each such simulated district plan. They find that the expected number of democratic seats
in the enacted plans is only one less than the average of the expected number of seats in the
simulated plans, leading them to conclude that the net effect of gerrymandering in the House
is trivial. Note that a putative advantage is that by incorporating the geographic distribution of
voters, this approach has the potential to account for geographic clustering.
Remark 3. Choosing simulated district plans from an appropriate distribution is a notoriously
difficult problem that is not even well defined. Issues one must contend with include how
to deal with constraints imposed by the Voting Rights Act; how to recognize communities of
interest; the extent to which one should respect existing political boundaries; how to define
compactness; how strict compactness constraints should be made; and how to weigh all of
these disparate factors. Even once one makes such decisions, it is not necessarily clear how
one chooses uniformly from the space of remaining “acceptable” district plans. Finally, there
remains the nebulous problem of how to relate the choices made to what human map drawers
do, or should be doing, when they create maps. We do not address these issues as they arise
in [CC16] as they are nuanced and beyond the scope of this paper.
The declination discussed in Section 3 and the functions utilized by Royden and Li directly
count extra seats won as a result of partisan asymmetry in the vote distribution. However im-
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perfect these measures may be, we have no more logically direct way to count such seats. As
mentioned above, the approach of Chen and Cottrell has the advantage that it more directly ad-
dresses inherent geographic advantages. However, while this approach should, a priori, be able
to count extra seats, the connection is less direct. In the remainder of this section we argue, in
fact, that the logistic regression model used fails to capture gerrymandering to any appreciable
degree. In the computations that follow, we will omit uncontested districts: Our goal is not to
accurately estimate the exact number of seats a given party would win, but simply to see how
the estimate changes under SPC.
We now present the notation required for the model. Let pi denote the presidential vote in
district i. Following Chen and Cottrell, we consider a simple logistic-regression model for esti-
mating the expected number of democratic seats won in district i as a function of pi. According
to their logistic model, the expected number of democratic seats in district i is F (β0 + β1pi)
where F (x) = (1 + e−x)−1 and (β0, β1) are regression coefficients that are estimated from
the data. For an election with presidential vote p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN), the expected number of
democratic seats is then
E(p) =
N∑
i=1
F (β0 + β1pi). (1)
Chen and Cottrell used presidential data from 2008 and 2012 along with the four House elec-
tions from 2006 to 2012 to estimate the parameters β0 and β1. In order to use election data from
1972 to 2012, we replaced β0 and β1 with random year effects β0[j] and β1[j] with j indexing
the year. Under this model (suppressing the dependence of E(p) on j), the expected number of
democratic seats becomes
E(p) =
N∑
i=1
F (β0[j] + β1[j]pi). (2)
Estimates of the intercept and slope parameters β0[j] and β1[j] using maximum likelihood are
listed in Table 2.
Our approach to analyzing this model is analogous to our validation of the S-declination:
We apply SPC to historical vote distributions and observe the effect on the predicted number
of seats each party will win. However, there is an added complication. When packing and
cracking, the vote of greatest interest in district i is not the presidential vote pi, but the legislative
vote `i. Unfortunately, SPC provides us only with a modified legislative vote. We will need a
mechanism for estimating district-level presidential votes from district-level legislative votes.
If pi and `i directly determined each other, there would be no need for a logistic regression
in (1). You would be able to determine who won the seat from the value of pi without any
appeal to probability. As shown in Figure 5 (see also Table 2), there is some justification for
asserting a linear relation between the presidential vote and the legislative vote. (This relation is
certainly much stronger in some years than others.) One could also choose to fit the three subsets
corresponding to elections in which there is a democratic incumbent, a republican incumbent,
or no incumbent, however we do not pursue this variation.
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Figure 5: Plot of legislative vote `◦ versus presidential vote p◦. Races are colored according
to incumbency statuses of the candidates: democratic incumbent (blue); republican incumbent
(red); no incumbent or two incumbents from opposite parties (gray). Regression lines are also
plotted. (A) Presidential-year elections from 1972–2012: intercept 0.22, slope 0.51, r2 = 0.42;
(B) 1980 election: intercept 0.23, slope 0.43, r2 = 0.44; (C) 2012 election: intercept 0.08, slope
0.85, r2 = 0.91.
In the remainder of this subsection we will model pi as a linear function, g, of `i. Letting
j index the year, we set pi = g(`i) := γ0[j] + γ1[j]`i for some coefficients γ0[j] and γ1[j]. The
function g is dependent on the year j, however we will suppress this from the notation. For
the remainder of this section we will reserve p◦ = (p◦1, . . . , p
◦
N) and `
◦ = (`◦1, . . . , `
◦
N) for the
historical values given to us in our data set. We reserve `∗ = (`∗1, . . . , `
∗
N) for the legislative
vote after applying one of the four variations of SPC to `◦. The presidential vote associated to
`∗i will be written p
∗
i = g(`
∗
i ). (Note, however, that g(`
◦
i ) does not equal p
◦
i .)
4.2.1 The simplest model: γ0[j] = 0, γ1[j] = 1 for all j.
We begin with the simplest reasonable parameters: γ0[j] = 0 and γ1[j] = 1 for all j. While there
are a number of obvious objections to assuming the presidential and legislative votes are equal,
there are reasons to believe that it is a best-case scenario for the Chen-Cottrell approach. That
is, if their approach does not record SPC under this model, then it will not do so under a more
tenuous relation between the two votes. Since E(g(`◦)) is the expected number of democratic
seats initially, E(g(`∗)) − E(g(`◦)) is the change in the expected number of democratic seats
after SPC. In Figure 4, a vertical coordinate of 1 indicates one more seat for the Republicans.
For consistency, therefore, we consider the negative,E(g(`◦)))−E(g(`∗)), the expected change
in the number of republican seats. By (2) and our choice of γ0[j] = 0, γ1[j] = 1, we then have
12
Figure 6: Change in the logistic-regression estimate of number of seats due to SPC us-
ing (3). Red squares correspond to the 418 ways in which House elections since 1972 can
be packed/cracked so that the Republicans win one more seat, subject to the constraints noted
in the main text; blue dots indicate the 390 corresponding ways in which elections since
1972 can be packed/cracked so that the Democrats win one more seat. The linear regression
lines are 0.236 − 0.001N (r2 < 0.01, RMSE = 0.207) and −0.227 + 0.000N (r2 < 0.01,
RMSE = 0.216), respectively.
that the expected change in republican seats is given by
E(g(`◦))− E(g(`∗)) =
N∑
i=1
[F (β0[j] + β1[j]g(`
◦)i)− F (β0[j] + β1[j]g(`∗)i)]
=
N∑
i=1
[F (β0[j] + β1[j](0 + 1 · `◦i )− F (β0[j] + β1[j](0 + 1 · `∗i )]
=
N∑
i=1
[F (β0[j] + β1[j]`
◦
i )− F (β0[j] + β1[j]`∗i ))].
(3)
Note that we do not use p◦ in the above computation. No matter how the function g biases the
answer, we at least want this bias to be consistent both before and after the SPC.
Figure 6 depicts values of the expression in (3) under the flipping of one seat via SPC. This
figure is analogous to Figure 4, which shows the corresponding results for the S-declination. If
this model faithfully recorded the effects of gerrymandering — and hence packing and cracking
— we would see the red squares vertically clustered around +1 and the blue circles vertically
clustered around −1. However, as seen in Figure 6, this is not at all the case.
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Figure 7: (A) Example showing how cracking a district could lead to essentially no change in
the expected number of democratic districts, as determined by the logistic model. (B) Example
showing how packing a district could lead to a moderate decrease in the expected number of
democratic districts, as determined by the logistic model.
4.2.2 Qualitative explanation for why Chen-Cottrell model fails.
We believe there is a simple reason for the relative invisibility of packing and cracking to the
logistic model. When districts are redrawn so that, say a 55% democratic district becomes
45% democratic, the map drawers are doing so with a detailed understanding of the partisan
composition of each affected district. While the gerrymander will degrade over time and may
be susceptible to wave elections, the probability of the particular district electing a democratic
legislator goes from essentially one to essentially zero. However, the probability of that dis-
trict being democratic as determined by the fitted logistic curve will change by a much smaller
amount. Furthermore, the decrease in probability for the given district will be at least par-
tially offset by increased probabilities in the districts to which the democratic voters are now
allocated.
Figure 7 illustrates how cracking or packing a single district could lead to at most a small
change in the expected number of seats as determined by a sum over the probabilities obtained
from the logistic regression. Since we are setting pi = 0+ 1 · `i = `i, there is only a single vote
fraction associate to each district, which we denote by vi. We write qi for F (β0 + β1vi), the
probability of a democratic win in district i. The corresponding values after SPC are denoted by
v∗i and q
∗
i , respectively. Suppose District 1 is being flipped from republican to democratic and
suppose District 2 received some of the reallocated democratic votes. In Figure 7.A, we see that
the reduction in probability from q1 to q∗1 is almost exactly offset by a corresponding increase
from q2 to q∗2 . In Figure 7.B, there is almost no change from q2 to q
∗
2 , leading to a net decrease
in the expected number of democratic seats. However, the net decrease is still much less than
one.
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4.2.3 Choosing γ0[j] and γ1[j] through linear regression.
The choice of (γ0[j], γ1[j]) = (0, 1) for all j is useful for understanding the structural reasons
for why the presidential-vote logistic model does not record partisan gerrymandering. However,
an ordinary linear regression fitted to the presidential and legislative votes should yield a quan-
titatively superior model. If we perform an ordinary linear regression using a random effects
model, we obtain the estimates of the coefficients γ0[j] and γ1[j] displayed in Table 2. But these
more defensible choices of γ0[j] and γ1[j] do little to improve the correspondence between SPC
and the difference E(g(`◦))− E(g(`∗)). In Figure 8 we display the values of
E(g(`◦))− E(g(`∗)) =
N∑
i=1
F (β0[j] + β1[j](γ0[j] + γ1[j]`
◦
i ))−
N∑
i=1
F (β0[j] + β1[j](γ0[j] + γ1[j]`
∗
i )) (4)
as j indexes the years from 1972 to 2012. While there is better separation between the two
populations, the absolute change in the expected number of seats is only about a tenth of a seat,
even worse than when we conflated legislative and presidential votes.
Table 2: Random effect estimates from linear and logistic models. The second and third
columns contain estimates of the coefficients γ0[j] and γ1[j] for linear regression of presiden-
tial vote regressed on legislative vote for presidential election years using a random effects
model where intercept and slope were random effects. The fourth and fifth columns list esti-
mates for the intercepts and slopes for the random effects logistic regression of district outcome
on presidential vote for presidential election years.
Year (j) Intercept (γ0[j]) Slope (γ1[j]) Intercept (β0[j]) Slope (β1[j])
1972 0.197 0.362 -3.55 9.6
1976 0.292 0.391 -7.91 17.3
1980 0.234 0.427 -5.49 12.7
1984 0.183 0.451 -6.19 16.0
1988 0.255 0.395 -5.58 13.1
1992 0.250 0.527 -7.71 15.8
1996 0.234 0.625 -11.37 20.8
2000 0.210 0.592 -8.22 16.3
2004 0.176 0.622 -10.63 21.7
2008 0.157 0.691 -9.38 18.9
2012 0.082 0.850 -19.18 37.2
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Figure 8: Plot of data in Figure 6 using using (4) instead of (3). The linear regression lines are
0.128 − 0.000N (r2 < 0.01, RMSE = 0.159) and −0.133 + 0.000N (r2 < 0.01, RMSE =
0.163), respectively.
4.2.4 Noise in the linear model.
One possibility worth examining is that the failure of the Chen-Cottrell model in our simulations
of SPC is due to our modeling of the relationship between presidential vote and legislative vote
as linear. The linear relationship is much truer in some years than others and, with the exception
of 2012, is never completely convincing. But arguing against this possibility is the fact that data
points from 2012 are included in Figures 6 and 8 and there is no subpopulation clustered around
±1. In fact, the sensitivity does seem better for 2012 with a median (absolute-value) change
of just over one half. Regardless, any “noise” added to the relationship will merely impede the
ability of the presidential-vote logistic regression model to record packing and cracking.
A model that postulates a linear relation between the proportion of legislative and presi-
dential vote in a district induces a probability model for the probability of a democratic win
in a district given the presidential vote. It can be shown that the effect of presidential vote in
the probability model decreases to zero as the correlation between legislative and presidential
vote decreases to zero. In other words, if there is a significant amount of noise in the rela-
tion between legislative and presidential vote, presidential vote will be a weak predictor of the
winner of a district, further degrading the ability of the logistic model to capture the effects of
gerrymandering.
Remark 4. Incumbent US House Representatives typically win upwards of 90% of their races.
In particular, the fitted logistic regression curves will be very different for the classes of 1)
democratic incumbents, 2) republican incumbents and 3) no incumbents. There is no reason
incumbency cannot be incorporated into the Chen-Cottrell model, but there is one very im-
portant issue: The assumptions made for the distribution of incumbents will have a significant
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Figure 9: Plot of democratic presidential vote fraction versus legislative seat winner (points
have been jittered) for the year 2008. The fitted logistic curve with parameters β0 = −9.38 and
β1 = 18.9 (from Table 2) is also shown.
impact on the conclusions. Any historical gerrymander will change the relative proportion of
incumbents which, in turn, will affect the future probabilities for who wins which seats.
5 Conclusion
If the net impact of partisan gerrymandering on the US democracy is understood to be minimal
on a national level, there are likely to be only piecemeal efforts to mitigate its influence. If, on
the other hand, its effect is shown to be large, there is likely to be a greater political and judicial
will to take steps to counter it on a national level. Unfortunately, as detailed in [CC16], there are
manifest difficulties in directly measuring the net effect of gerrymandering. The Chen-Cottrell
approach inarguably addresses some of these difficulties. For example, by using contempora-
neous electoral data, it can remove year-to-year effects. And, assuming the simulations draw
from the space of all districts in an appropriate manner, it can account for geographic clustering.
(Unfortunately, there is no objectively “correct” distribution to draw from. Even showing that
the draws are sufficiently random is a difficult matter.)
However, as we have attempted to show above, performing a logistic regression on presi-
dential data is fatally flawed for this particular purpose. Not only do our simulations indicate
that it does not effectively record packing and cracking, but we believe there are convincing
theoretical reasons for concluding it does not. The S-declination, defined and studied in this
paper, provides a measure of the number of seats gained/lost through partisan gerrymandering.
The validity of the S-declination for this purpose is strongly supported by simulated packing
and cracking (Figure 4).
Neither we nor Royden and Li take into account geographic clustering that has been shown
to exist in [CR13]. Nonetheless, their results and our Table 1 suggest that the net number of
seats won by gerrymandering is likely to be significant. And, as noted in [War17], it is not clear
to what degree district plans should be allowed to exacerbate (or mitigate) inherent geographic
distributions. Regardless, if there is only a minimal net effect of gerrymandering on a national
17
level, we find no evidence in [CC16] to support this position.
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